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INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to FED. R. APP. PROC. 27, Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense 
Fund (“Eagle Forum”) requests leave to file the accompanying amicus curiae brief 
in support of the defendant-appellant Clerk’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The 
parties have all consented to this motion.1 
IDENTITY, INTEREST AND AUTHORITY TO FILE  
Since its founding in 1981, Eagle Forum has consistently defended 
traditional American values, including not only traditional marriage, defined as the 
union of husband and wife, but also the religious freedoms that were instrumental 
in this Nation’s founding. Although the Supreme Court recently held that our 
“Constitution … does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage 
on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex,” even that Court 
acknowledged that the “First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and 
persons are given proper protection.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607 
(2015). The litigation thus presents a new issue in this Circuit and nationally on 
how to balance the important interests at stake on all side. For the foregoing 
reasons, Eagle Forum has a direct and vital interest in the issues raised here. 
                                           
1  Consistent with FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5), the undersigned counsel certifies 
that: counsel for amicus authored this brief in whole; no counsel for a party 
authored this brief in any respect; and no person or entity – other than amicus, its 
members, and its counsel – contributed monetarily to this brief’s preparation or 
submission. 
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AUTHORITY TO FILE EAGLE FORUM’S BRIEF 
Motions for leave to file an amicus brief should explain the movant’s 
interest and “the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the matters 
asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case.” FED. R. APP. P. 29(b). The 
Advisory Committee Note to the 1998 amendments to Rule 29 explain that “[t]he 
amended rule [Rule 29(b)] … requires that the motion state the relevance of the 
matters asserted to the disposition of the case.” The Advisory Committee Note then 
quotes Sup. Ct. R. 37.1 to emphasize the value of amicus briefs that bring a court’s 
attention to relevant matter not raised by the parties: 
An amicus curiae brief which brings relevant matter to 
the attention of the Court that has not already been 
brought to its attention by the parties is of considerable 
help to the Court.  
Id. (quoting Sup. Ct. R. 37.1).  
As now-Justice Samuel Alito wrote while serving on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, “I think that our court would be well advised to 
grant motions for leave to file amicus briefs unless it is obvious that the proposed 
briefs do not meet Rule 29’s criteria as broadly interpreted. I believe that this is 
consistent with the predominant practice in the courts of appeals.” Neonatology 
Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 293 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Michael E. Tigar 
and Jane B. Tigar, Federal Appeals – Jurisdiction and Practice 181 (3d ed. 1999) 
and Robert L. Stern, Appellate Practice in the United States 306, 307-08 (2d ed. 
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1989)). Now-Justice Alito quoted the Tigar treatise favorably for the statement that 
“[e]ven when the other side refuses to consent to an amicus filing, most courts of 
appeals freely grant leave to file, provided the brief is timely and well-reasoned.” 
293 F.3d at 133.  
FILING THE EAGLE FORUM’S BRIEF WILL SERVE THE 
COURT’S RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES RAISED 
The Eagle Forum brief will aid the Court in resolving the issues of first 
impression presented in this appeal and in determining whether to stay the District 
Court’s ruling until this Court can determine the appropriate balancing of the 
important constitutional rights asserted by the respective parties. In particular, the 
Eagle Forum brief covers two important issues that the defendant-appellant did not 
address in her motion but which this Court can or even must consider. 
First, Eagle Forum argues that – because the balancing test for weighing a 
county clerk’s religious-freedom rights against a couple’s right to a marriage 
license is unclear, federal courts can incorporate the standards from the Kentucky 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, KY. REV. STAT. §446.350 (“Kentucky 
RFRA”), into the county clerk’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §1988(a). Because 
the clerk presses Kentucky RFRA, the arguments that the Eagle Forum brief makes 
under 42 U.S.C. §1988(a) are available to her, even if she did not argue precisely 
the same facet of the issue in her motion. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 
534-35 (1992). 
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Second, Eagle Forum argues that county clerks in Kentucky share the state’s 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, which is sufficiently in the 
nature of jurisdictional argument for the clerk to raise it for the first time on appeal. 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974). The asserted basis for suing the 
clerk is that her refusal to provide marriage licenses violates federal law as laid 
down in Obergefell, but the clerk has denied marriage licenses to both same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples (i.e., equally to everyone), which cannot violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984). Similarly, 
neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever found a due-process right to 
obtain marriage licenses in one’s county of residence, especially when marriage 
licenses are readily available nearby. Without an ongoing violation of federal law, 
the plaintiffs-appellees cannot make out a case against a government officer like a 
county clerk. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 
(2002). Without an exception to sovereign immunity, this Court must remand with 
orders to dismiss this litigation. Finally, if the Court entered judgment without 
resolving the immunity issues that the Eagle Forum brief raises, the county clerk 
could collaterally challenge any relief. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 
137, 152-53 & n.6 (2009). As a result, not only judicial economy but also the needs 
to assure itself of the Article III redressability that underlies any relief compel this 
Court to consider these issues. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should grant Eagle Forum leave to file its amicus brief. 
Dated: August 21, 2015 Respectfully submitted,
_______________________________
Lawrence J. Joseph





Counsel for Movant Eagle Forum 
Education & Legal Defense Fund
/s/ Lawrence J. Joseph
      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-1     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 6 (6 of 31)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on August 21, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing 
motion for leave to file – together with the accompanying brief – with the Clerk of 
the Court for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by using the Appellate 
CM/ECF system. Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be 
served by the CM/ECF system. 
Dated: August 21, 2015 Respectfully submitted, 
Lawrence J. Joseph, D.C. Bar #464777 
1250 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 200 
Washington, DC 20036 
Tel: 202-355-9452 
Fax: 202-318-2254  
Email: ljoseph@larryjoseph.com 
Counsel for Movant Eagle Forum Education & 
Legal Defense Fund
/s/ Lawrence J. Joseph
      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-1     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 7 (7 of 31)
No. 15-5880 
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
APRIL MILLER, PH.D; KAREN ANN ROBERTS; SHANTEL BURKE; 
STEPHEN NAPIER; JODY FERNANDEZ; KEVIN HOLLOWAY; L. AARON 
SKAGGS; AND BARRY SPARTMAN,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
KIM DAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY, 
Defendant-Appellant.  
ON APPEAL FROM THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY,  
NO. 15-CV-0044-DLB (HON. DAVID L. BUNNING) 
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION 
& LEGAL DEFENSE FUND IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT’S 
MOTION TO STAY DISTRICT COURT’S AUGUST 12, 2015 







Lawrence J. Joseph, D.C. Bar #464777 
1250 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 200 




      Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-2     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 1 (8 of 31)
6CA-1
8/08 Page 1 of  2
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations
and Financial Interest
Sixth Circuit
Case Number: Case Name: 
Name of counsel:  
Pursuant to 6th Cir. R. 26.1, 
Name of Party
makes the following disclosure:
1. Is said party a subsidiary or affiliate of a publicly owned corporation?  If Yes, list below the
identity of the parent corporation or affiliate and the relationship between it and the named
party:
2. Is there a publicly owned corporation, not a party to the appeal, that has a financial interest
in the outcome?  If yes, list the identity of such corporation and the nature of the financial
interest:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on _____________________________________ the foregoing document was served on all
parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not,
by placing a true and correct copy in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to their address of record.
s/
This statement is filed twice:  when the appeal is initially opened and later, in the principal briefs, 
immediately preceding the table of contents.  See 6th Cir. R. 26.1 on page 2 of this form.
15-5880 Miller v. Davis
Lawrence J. Joseph





      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-2     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 2 (9 of 31)
 ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interest ........................ i 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................. ii 
Table of Authorities .............................................................................................. iv 
Identity, Interest and Authority to File ........................................................... 1 
Statement of the Case ........................................................................................... 1 
Summary of Argument ......................................................................................... 3 
Argument ................................................................................................................. 4 
I. The District Court Did Not Properly Balance the 
Clerk’s Religious-Freedom Rights with the Couples’ 
Marriage Rights ........................................................................................... 4 
A. No Precedent of this Court or the Supreme Court 
Expressly Provides a Balancing Test for the Two 
Rights at Issue Here ......................................................................... 5 
B. The Clerk’s Rights under Kentucky RFRA Are 
Enforceable in this Federal Challenge ......................................... 6 
II. This Court and the District Court Lack Jurisdiction to 
Compel the Clerk to Act against Her Religion ..................................... 7 
A. Sovereign Immunity Denies Federal Courts the 
Authority to Compel the Clerk to Issue Marriage 
Licenses ............................................................................................... 8 
1. Kentucky’s Sovereign Immunity Applies to 
County Clerks ........................................................................ 10 
2. The Couples Cannot Allege a Violation of 
Federal Law Sufficient to Invoke the Ex 
parte Young Exception to Sovereign 
Immunity ................................................................................ 11 
      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-2     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 3 (10 of 31)
 iii 
B. The Couples Cannot Establish Redressability 
Because the Clerk Would Remain Free to Attack 
this Court’s Judgment Collaterally on Sovereign 
Immunity Grounds ......................................................................... 13 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 13 
      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-2     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 4 (11 of 31)
 iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Akers v. McGinnis,  
352 F.3d 1030 (6th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 5 
Alden v. Maine,  
527 U.S. 706 (1999) ........................................................................................... 8 
Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,  
703 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 2013) .............................................................................. 9 
Edelman v. Jordan,  
415 U.S. 651 (1974) ........................................................................................... 9 
Ex parte Young,  
209 U.S. 123 (1908) ............................................................................. 3, 8-9, 11 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,  
443 U.S. 368 (1979) ....................................................................................... 5-6 
Hans v. Louisiana,  
134 U.S. 1 (1890) ............................................................................................... 8 
Heckler v. Mathews,  
465 U.S. 728 (1984) ......................................................................................... 12 
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t v. Smolcic,  
142 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2004) .............................................................................. 10 
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,  
405 U.S. 538 (1972) ........................................................................................... 7 
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford,  
155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892) ......................................................... 5 
Moor v. County of Alameda,  
411 U.S. 693 (1973) ........................................................................................... 7 
Obergefell v. Hodges,  
135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) ............................................................................. 1-4, 6-8 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,  
391 U.S. 563 (1968) ........................................................................................... 5 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey,  
505 U.S. 833 (1992) ................................................................................. 5-6, 11 
      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-2     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 5 (12 of 31)
 v 
Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ.,  
470 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 5 
Schwindel v. Meade Cnty.,  
113 S.W.3d 159 (Ky. 2003) .............................................................................. 10 
Sherbert v. Verner,  
374 U.S. 398 (1963) ........................................................................................... 5 
Snyder v. Buck,  
340 U.S. 15 (1950) ........................................................................................... 10 
Sossamon v. Texas,  
131 S.Ct. 1651 (2011) ........................................................................................ 8 
St. Matthews Fire Prot. Dist. v. Aubrey,  
304 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) ................................................................. 10 
Stafford v. Briggs,  
444 U.S. 527 (1980) ......................................................................................... 11 
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey,  
557 U.S. 137 (2009) ..................................................................................... 9, 13 
Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,  
535 U.S. 635 (2002) ........................................................................................... 9 
Waters v. Churchill,  
511 U.S. 661 (1994) ......................................................................................... 12 
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,  
492 U.S. 490 (1989) ........................................................................................... 6 
Wilson v. Morgan,  
477 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 7 
Wilson-Jones v. Caviness,  
99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir. 1996) .......................................................................... 9-10 
Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co.,  
567 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 13 
Yanero v. Davis,  
65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001) ................................................................................ 10 
STATUTES 
U.S. CONST. art. III ................................................................................................... 13 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI ................................................................................. 3-4, 8-10 
      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-2     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 6 (13 of 31)
 vi 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ..................................................................................... 8, 12 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 3 .......................................................................... 12 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 4 .......................................................................... 12 
5 U.S.C. §702 ........................................................................................................... 11 
28 U.S.C. §1343 ......................................................................................................... 7 
28 U.S.C. §1343(4) .................................................................................................... 7 
28 U.S.C. §1391(e) .................................................................................................. 11 
42 U.S.C. §1983 ......................................................................................................... 7 
42 U.S.C. §1988(a) ............................................................................................ 3-4, 7 
KY. REV. STAT. §402.080 ........................................................................................... 2 
Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act,  
KY. REV. STAT. §446.350 ............................................................................ 3-7 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5) ............................................................................................. 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending  




      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-2     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 7 (14 of 31)
 1 
IDENTITY, INTEREST AND AUTHORITY TO FILE  
Amicus curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund (“Eagle 
Forum”), a nonprofit corporation, submits this amicus brief in support of the 
appellant’s stay application with the accompanying motion for leave to file.1 Since 
its founding in 1981, Eagle Forum has consistently defended traditional American 
values, including not only traditional marriage, defined as the union of husband 
and wife, but also the religious freedoms that were instrumental in this Nation’s 
founding. Although the Supreme Court recently held that our “Constitution … 
does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms 
as accorded to couples of the opposite sex,” even that Court acknowledged that the 
“First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given 
proper protection.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). The 
litigation thus presents a new issue in this Circuit and nationally on how to balance 
the important interests at stake on all side. For the foregoing reasons, Eagle Forum 
has a direct and vital interest in the issues raised here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are same-sex and opposite-sex couples (the “Couples”) residing in 
                                           
1  Consistent with FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5), the undersigned counsel certifies 
that: counsel for amicus authored this brief in whole; no counsel for a party 
authored this brief in any respect; and no person or entity – other than amicus, its 
members, and its counsel – contributed monetarily to this brief’s preparation or 
submission. 
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Rowan County, Kentucky, who wish to obtain marriage licenses. The defendant is 
the Rowan County Clerk (the “Clerk”), whom Kentucky law authorizes to issue 
marriage licenses. In its current configuration, Kentucky’s marriage-license form 
would require the Clerk to violate her faith if she issued a marriage license bearing 
her name and imprimatur for a same-sex marriage, and she has filed a third-party 
complaint against appropriate Kentucky officials to achieve an accommodation of 
all parties’ rights under which the Couples could obtain marriage licenses without 
a violation of the Clerk’s religious-freedom rights.  
In the meantime, the Clerk has ceased dispensing marriage licenses to 
anyone, consistent with the Obergefell holding that the “Constitution … does not 
permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as 
accorded to couples of the opposite sex.” 135 S.Ct. at 2607 (emphasis added). 
Under Kentucky law, however, the Couples are free to obtain marriage licenses at 
more than 100 locations elsewhere in the state, KY. REV. STAT. §402.080, 
including the two metropolitan areas to which the Couples have travelled to attend 
proceedings before the District Court below. See Stay Appl. at 3 (60 miles to 
Ashland and 100 miles to Covington).2 The Couples’ traveling those distances does 
not appear to have presented a significant burden.  
                                           
2  Catlettsburg (the county seat of Boyd County) is in the Huntington-Ashland-
Ironton metropolitan area, and Covington is a county seat of Kenton County. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although the Couples demand their rights under Obergefell, this litigation 
requires the Court to balance the Couples’ asserted marriage rights with the Clerk’s 
free-exercise rights. Because neither this Court nor the Supreme Court have set the 
appropriate test for weighing these competing rights (Section I.A), federal law is 
therefore “deficient … to furnish suitable remedies” within the meaning of 42 
U.S.C. §1988(a). Under the circumstances, a federal court evaluating this conflict 
in Kentucky can and should look to the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, KY. REV. STAT. §446.350 (“Kentucky RFRA”), to balance these interests 
(Section I.B). 
In Kentucky, the county clerk is a constitutional office that enjoys sovereign 
immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment (Section 
II.A.1.). No decision of the Supreme Court or this Court has ever addressed – 
much less found – a constitutional right to obtain a marriage license in one’s 
county of residence, particularly where marriage licenses are readily available 
elsewhere and nearby in the state. Moreover, the Clerk here ceased providing 
marriage licenses to anyone, thereby ensuring the equal treatment that Obergefell 
mandates. Under the circumstances, there is no ongoing violation of federal law 
(Section II.A.2.), which is a precondition for sidestepping sovereign immunity 
under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity (Section II.A). Because 
      Case: 15-5880     Document: 24-2     Filed: 08/21/2015     Page: 10 (17 of 31)
 4 
the Clerk may raise her immunity not only for the first time on appeal but also 
collaterally even after an adverse judgment, this Court must consider her immunity 
in deciding the stay application to ensure it has jurisdiction and can issue an order 
that provides redress (Section II.B.).  
ARGUMENT 
Amicus Eagle Forum fully supports the Clerk’s religious-freedom arguments 
but writes separately in the abbreviated briefing of her stay application to make 
two primary points that this Court can consider at this stage and on the merits. 
First, this Court can and should rely on Kentucky RFRA to balances the parties’ 
respective interests here under 42 U.S.C. §1988(a). Second, the Clerk is immune 
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PROPERLY BALANCE THE 
CLERK’S RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM RIGHTS WITH THE COUPLES’ 
MARRIAGE RIGHTS 
The same-sex plaintiffs driving this litigation impatiently assert their new 
rights under Obergefell and thus frame this litigation exclusively as the denial of 
their rights. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Couples, 
however, amicus Eagle Forum respectfully submits that this litigation requires the 
balancing of competing rights.3 Moreover, in the context of balancing the 
competing federal rights at issue, federal civil rights law provides for looking to 
                                           
3  As explained in Section II.A.2., infra, amicus Eagle Forum respectfully 
submits that the Couples do not, in fact, have a federal right to assert here.  
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state laws such as Kentucky RFRA when federal law itself does not provide a 
framework for striking the right balance. 
A. No Precedent of this Court or the Supreme Court Expressly 
Provides a Balancing Test for the Two Rights at Issue Here  
Although the Couples emphasize that the Clerk is a public officer, we are 
long past the era of Justice Holmes’ famous dictum that a policeman “may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.” McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 
(Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.). As a result, public officers and employees no longer 
“may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights” in 
all circumstances. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also 
Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(rationale of public-employee free-speech cases applies to free-exercise cases); cf. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (government cannot condition public 
benefits on accepting Saturday employment if that is contrary to religious faith).  
Cases like this necessarily must strike the right balance between the 
employee’s right and the larger public right. Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 
1036 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, courts routinely balance rights against each other. 
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 
(1992) (women’s right to abortion versus states’ right to regulate women’s health 
and interest in the unborn child’s life); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 
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398-99 (1979) (criminal defendants’ due-process rights versus the media’s and the 
public’s freedom of the press). When federal courts strike such balances in specific 
contexts – especially in areas of judge-made law – the resulting balancing test 
necessarily appears nowhere in the Constitution. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 
(creating “undue-burden” test); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 
547-48 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Here, the Supreme Court has created a 
new right to same-sex marriage, recognized that that new right may conflict with 
religious liberty, but not as yet provided a balancing test for resolving the 
inevitable conflicts. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2607. This case of first impression 
therefore requires this Court to strike the right balance between the Clerk’s rights 
and those asserted by the Couples. 
B. The Clerk’s Rights under Kentucky RFRA Are Enforceable in 
this Federal Challenge 
The Clerk has asserted rights under Kentucky RFRA against compelling her 
to violate her religious beliefs, but the District Court rejected the use of Kentucky 
law in that context. Amicus Eagle Forum respectfully submits that, given the 
absence of federal law to resolve the balancing of the Clerk’s religious freedom 
versus the Couples’ marriage rights, a federal court should look to state law to 
balance the sensitive civil rights issues here: 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred 
on the district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, 
and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all 
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persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for 
their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in 
conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as 
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in 
all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are 
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable 
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common 
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and 
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction 
of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same 
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said 
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause[.] 
42 U.S.C. §1988(a).4 Because existing federal precedents and laws do not guide 
federal courts on how to balance the rights at issue here, this Court can look to 
Kentucky RFRA. See Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2007). 
Nothing in Kentucky RFRA is inconsistent with federal law. 
II. THIS COURT AND THE DISTRICT COURT LACK JURISDICTION 
TO COMPEL THE CLERK TO ACT AGAINST HER RELIGION 
As explained below, the Clerk’s constitutional office is entitled to sovereign 
immunity under Kentucky law, and she may assert that immunity for the first time 
on appeal or even collaterally after judgment. Nothing in Obergefell creates an 
absolute right to receive marriage licenses in Rowan County – at least not when 
                                           
4  As used in §1988(a), “Title 24” includes 28 U.S.C. §1343 and 42 U.S.C. 
§1983. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 n.7 (1972). Although 28 
U.S.C. §1343(4) and 42 U.S.C. §1988(a) do not elevate Kentucky law to an 
independent federal cause of action, Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 
700-04 (1973), they do allow federal courts to resort to state law, as necessary, to 
declare the law “not inconsistent with the Constitution… of the United States.” 42 
U.S.C. §1988(a). 
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marriage licenses are readily available elsewhere in Kentucky – and the Clerk’s 
even-handed denial of licenses to both same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples 
easily satisfies the equality principles in Obergefell. For that reason, there is no 
ongoing violation of federal law and thus no basis for sidestepping the Clerk’s 
immunity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. In sum, the 
federal courts have no power to compel the Clerk to act. 
A. Sovereign Immunity Denies Federal Courts the Authority to 
Compel the Clerk to Issue Marriage Licenses 
Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Sovereign 
immunity arises also from the Constitution’s structure and antedates the Eleventh 
Amendment, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999), applying equally to 
suits by a state’s own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Eleventh 
Amendment bars suits for both money damages and injunctive relief unless the 
state has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated immunity under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-16. The test for waiver is “a 
stringent one,” and “consent … must be unequivocally expressed.” Sossamon v. 
Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011) (interior quotations and citations omitted). 
Nothing suggests that Kentucky or the Clerk have waived sovereign immunity. 
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Under the officer-suit exception of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), 
however, sovereign immunity does not bar some suits in which the plaintiff seeks 
only prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to avert an ongoing violation of 
federal law. This analysis requires a “straightforward inquiry into whether the 
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly 
characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 
U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (interior quotations omitted). In the absence of an ongoing 
violation of federal law, however, the Young exception does not relieve plaintiffs 
of the defendant’s immunity. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645; accord Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t 
of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 966 (6th Cir. 2013). As explained below, the Couples have 
not identified an ongoing violation of federal law sufficient to trigger Young. 
Although the Clerk did not raise sovereign immunity in her stay application, 
the defense is sufficiently jurisdictional that she can raise it at any time, even on 
appeal: the “Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a 
jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court.” Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th 
Cir. 1996). Indeed, sovereign immunity is one of the few jurisdictional arguments 
that one can raise collaterally to attack an adverse judgment. Travelers Indem. Co. 
v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 152-53 & n.6 (2009). For that reason, amicus Eagle Forum 
respectfully submits that, under the circumstances, this Court must consider the 
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Clerk’s immunity: “a federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the 
court’s jurisdiction is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Wilson-Jones, 99 F.3d 
at 206 (emphasis in original, alterations and internal quotations omitted). 
1. Kentucky’s Sovereign Immunity Applies to County Clerks 
Although county clerks in some states may lack their state’s immunity from 
suit under the Eleventh Amendment, county clerks in Kentucky are immune from 
suit to the same extent as the state. Schwindel v. Meade Cnty., 113 S.W.3d 159, 
163 (Ky. 2003). “County Clerk” is a constitutional office, St. Matthews Fire Prot. 
Dist. v. Aubrey, 304 S.W.3d 56, 60 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009), and indeed “the existence 
of counties predates the Commonwealth itself.” Lexington-Fayette Urban County 
Gov’t v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 131 n.1 (Ky. 2004). Further, “when an officer 
or employee of a governmental agency is sued in [a] representative capacity, the 
officer’s or employee’s actions are afforded the same immunity, if any, to which 
the agency, itself, would be entitled.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 
2001). As such, the Clerk is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. 
Although the Couples have styled their suit against the Clerk individually, 
their request for declaratory and injunctive relief is necessarily a representative-
capacity suit: if she left office, the Clerk would be wholly unaffected by 
declaratory or injunctive relief and would be without power to redress any injury. 
Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 18 (1950). Indeed, suits against officials in their 
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“individual capacity under color of legal authority” are simply the flip side of 
representative-capacity suits against them in their “official capacity,” where former 
denies any authority whatsoever for the challenged action taken “under the color of 
authority.” See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 539 (1980); cf. 5 U.S.C. §702, 28 
U.S.C. §1391(e) (listing official-capacity and color-of-legal-authority actions as 
distinct). “Astute practitioners know [to name officers individually], and suits 
against officers in their personal capacity are likely to be numerous in the future as 
they have been in the past.” Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely 
Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 CHI. L. REV. 435, 453-54 (1962). At least for 
purposes of injunctive and declaratory relief, the Couples have brought a 
representative-capacity suit. 
2. The Couples Cannot Allege a Violation of Federal Law 
Sufficient to Invoke the Ex parte Young Exception to 
Sovereign Immunity 
Even without the problem of a court’s needing to balance competing federal 
rights discussed in Section I.A, supra, no marriage-rights decision of the Supreme 
Court has ever found an absolute right to obtain a marriage license in one’s county 
of residence, especially when marriage licenses are readily available nearby. Cf. 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (significant travel distances for women seeking an abortion 
do not violate that judge-made right). To the extent that the language of a decision 
would support that perceived right, that language would be mere dicta when the 
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court did not face that specific question: “cases cannot be read as foreclosing an 
argument that they never dealt with.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 
(1994). Accordingly, there is no substantive due-process right to obtain marriage 
licenses in Rowan County under the Due Process Clause. 
Similarly, the Clerk’s denying marriage licenses to both same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples defeats any claim to an equal-protection violation: 
[W]hen the right invoked is that to equal treatment, the 
appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a 
result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits 
from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits 
to the excluded class 
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984) (emphasis in original, interior 
quotations omitted). The Clerk has adopted an interim solution that, quite frankly, 
could qualify as a permanent solution under the Equal Protection Clause. The 
treatment is entirely equal. But even the Clerk does not propose that her interim 
solution remain in place forever. Instead, her third-party complaint seeks relief 
from Kentucky that would alleviate the need for her to violate her religious beliefs 
while enabling Couples (and future couples) to obtain marriage licenses even in 
Rowan County. See Stay Appl. at 14-15. In any event, there clearly is no ongoing 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Given that there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Couples 
have no basis for sidestepping the Clerk’s sovereign immunity to seek prospective 
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relief to enforce federal law. As such, this Court should remand with orders to 
dismiss the Couples’ suit. 
B. The Couples Cannot Establish Redressability Because the Clerk 
Would Remain Free to Attack this Court’s Judgment Collaterally 
on Sovereign Immunity Grounds  
Under Bailey, 557 U.S. at 152-53 & n.6, the Clerk remains free to attack a 
judgment of this Court or the District Court collaterally on immunity grounds if 
this Court does not resolve the immunity issue. As such, amicus Eagle Forum 
respectfully submits that the Couples will not have established that a federal court 
can redress their injury unless the immunity issue resolves in the Couples’ favor. 
Without redressability, of course, an Article III court must not render judgment at 
all. Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 793 (6th Cir. 2009). For that 
reason, amicus Eagle Forum respectfully submits that this Court must address the 
Clerk’s immunity from suit. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should stay the District Court’s order dated August 12, 2015, 
pending final resolution of the appeal in this Court. 
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